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Abstract — This paper presents experimental results of the 
implementation of network steganography method called 
RSTEG (Retransmission Steganography). The main idea of 
RSTEG is to not acknowledge a successfully received packet to 
intentionally invoke retransmission. The retransmitted packet 
carries a steganogram instead of user data in the payload field. 
RSTEG can be applied to many network protocols that utilize 
retransmissions. We present experimental results for RSTEG 
applied to TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) as TCP is the 
most popular network protocol which ensures reliable data 
transfer. The main aim of the performed experiments was to 
estimate RSTEG steganographic bandwidth and detectability 
by observing its influence on the network retransmission level. 
Keywords: RSTEG, steganography, TCP, retransmission 
mechanism 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Steganography includes information hiding techniques to 
deliver secret data (steganograms) from sender to the 
receiver in such a way that no one else would be aware of the 
message existence and its exchange. To achieve these goals 
it needs a carrier in which steganograms will be embedded. 
Typical steganographic methods utilized as a carrier digital 
media like images, audio or video. Recent trend in 
information hiding is network steganography. It creates 
hidden channels by modifying network protocols. Thus in 
this case network protocol is a carrier of the secret data. 
Protocol-carrier modification includes modification of PDU 
(Protocol Data Unit), modification of PDU time relations or 
both (hybrid solution).  
RSTEG (Retransmission Steganography) is a hybrid 
network steganography method, which is intended for a 
broad class of protocols that utilise retransmission 
mechanisms. The main innovation of RSTEG is to not 
acknowledge a successfully received packet in order to 
intentionally invoke retransmission. The retransmitted packet 
of user data then carries a steganogram in the payload field. 
In 2009 we introduced RSTEG [4] and we presented 
simulation results which main aim was to measure and 
compare steganographic bandwidth of the proposed method 
for different TCP retransmission mechanisms as well as to 
determine the influence of RSTEG on the network 
retransmissions level. This paper is an extension of this work 
as we focus on practical RSTEG applications.  
RSTEG can be applied to many network protocols 
utilizing retransmissions. We decided to perform 
experiments for TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) [5] as 
a vast amount of Internet traffic (about 80-90%) is based on 
this protocol. 
Previous experiments were carried out in network 
simulators: ns2 and ns3 [10]. They have shown that RSTEG 
is effective and hard to detect. Results from these two 
simulation environments were different. However, it is not 
surprising as they both have different implementations of 
complex network protocols such as TCP. To prove RSTEG 
effectiveness and provide reliable results we decided to 
implement RSTEG on a Linux kernel and measure network 
traffic for the real TCP/IP stack. Main idea of RSTEG and 
then achieved experimental results are presented and 
described in next sections. 
II. GENERAL IDEA OF RSTEG 
In a simplified situation, a typical protocol that uses a 
retransmission mechanism based on timeouts obligates the 
receiver to acknowledge each received packet. When the 
packet is not successfully received, no acknowledgment is 
sent. After the timeout expires and the sender has not 
received the acknowledgement the packet is retransmitted 
(Fig. 1). 
 
Figure 1. Generic retransmission mechanism based on 
timeouts 
  
As mentioned in Section I, RSTEG uses a retransmission 
mechanism to exchange steganograms. Both the sender and 
the receiver are aware of the steganographic procedure. They 
reliably exchange packets during their connection; that is, 
e.g. they transfer a file. At some point during the connection, 
when the sender wants to send a steganogram, the receiver 
after successfully receiving a packet intentionally does not 
issue an acknowledgment message. In a normal situation, the 
sender is obligated to retransmit the lost packet when the 
timeframe, within which packet acknowledgement should 
have been received, expires. In the context of RSTEG, a 
sender replaces original payload with a steganogram instead 
of sending the same packet again. When the retransmitted 
packet reaches the receiver, he/she can then extract hidden 
information (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. RSTEG main idea 
 
The intentional retransmissions due to RSTEG should be 
kept at a reasonable level to avoid detection. To achieve this 
goal, it is necessary to determine the average number of 
natural retransmissions in TCP-based Internet traffic as well 
as to know how intentional retransmissions affect the 
network retransmission rate. Usually network 
retransmissions are caused by network overload, excessive 
delays or reordering of packets [6], and their number is 
estimated to account for up to 7% of all Internet traffic [6], 
[3], [1]. 
It must be also noted that based on results presented in 
[9] up to 0.09 % (1 in 1100) of TCP segments may be 
corrupted due to network delivery. As a result, an imperfect 
copy of a segment may be sent to the receiver. After 
reception of the invalid segment, verification is performed 
based on the value in the TCP Checksum field, and the need 
to retransmit is signalled to the sender. Thus, in this 
scenario, the original segment and the retransmitted one will 
differ from each other. Occurrences of this effect in IP 
networks mask the use of RSTEG.  
It is worth noting that even for the low rates of intentional 
retransmission (0.09%) that are required to mask RSTEG, if 
we assume that the TCP segments are generated at a rate of 
200 segments/s, with the connection lasting 5 minutes and 
the segment’s payload size being 1000 bytes, then this 
results in SB = 180 Bps, which is a rather high bandwidth, 
considering the other steganographic methods. 
RSTEG can be applied to all retransmission mechanisms 
used in TCP namely RTO (Retransmission Timeout) FR/R 
(Fast Retransmit/Recovery) or SACK (Selective ACK). It 
requires modification to both the sender and to the receiver. 
The sender should control the insertion procedure and 
decide when a receiver should invoke a retransmission. The 
sender is also responsible to keep the number of 
retransmissions at a non-suspicious level. The receiver’s 
role is to detect when the sender indicates that the 
intentional retransmission should be triggered. Then, when 
the retransmitted segment arrives, the receiver should be 
able to extract the steganogram. 
The sender must be able to mark segments selected for 
hidden communication (that is, retransmission request 
segments) so the receiver would know which segments 
retransmissions should be invoked and which segments will 
contain steganograms. However, marked TCP segment 
should not differ from those sent during a connection. The 
following procedure for marking sender segments is 
proposed. Let us assume that the sender and receiver share a 
secret Steg-Key (SK). For each fragment chosen for 
steganographic communication, the following hash function 
(H) is used to calculate the Identifying Sequence (IS): 
Note that Sequence Number and TCP Checksum denote 
values from the chosen TCP header fields in segments, || is 
the bits concatenation function, and CB is a control bit that 
allows the receiver to distinguish a retransmission request 
segment from a segment with a steganogram. For every 
TCP segment used for hidden communication, the resulting 
IS will have different value due to the variety of values in 
the Sequence Number and TCP Checksum header fields. All 
IS bits (or only selected ones) are distributed by the sender 
across a segment’s payload field in a predefined manner. 
The receiver must analyse each incoming segment; based on 
SK and values from the TCP header, the receiver calculates 
two values of IS, namely, one with CB = 1 and one with CB 
= 0. Then the receiver checks if and which IS is present 
inside the received segment. 
Let us present how RSTEG may be applied to the RTO 
retransmission mechanism (Fig. 2):  
• The sender marks a segment selected for hidden 
communication by distributing the IS across its 
payload.  
• After successful segment delivery, the receiver 
does not issue an ACK message.  
• When the RTO timer expires, the sender sends a 
steganogram inside the retransmitted segment’s 
payload.  
• The receiver extracts the steganogram and sends 
the appropriate acknowledgement. 
  )||||||( CBChecksumTCPNumberSequenceSKHIS =
  
Problems may arise when the segment that informs the 
receiver of a necessity to invoke an intentional 
retransmission (which contains user data together with the 
IS) is lost due to network conditions. In that case, a normal 
retransmission is triggered, and the receiver is not aware 
that the segment with hidden data will be sent. However, in 
this case, the sender believes that retransmission was 
invoked intentionally by the receiver, and so he/she issues 
the segment with steganogram and the IS. In this scenario, 
user data will be lost, and the cover connection may be 
disturbed.  
In order to address the situation in which the receiver 
reads a segment with an unexpected steganogram, the 
receiver should not acknowledge reception of this segment 
until he/she receives the segment with user data. When the 
ACK is not sent to the sender, another retransmission is 
invoked. The sender is aware of the data delivery failure, 
but he/she does not know which segment to retransmit, so 
he/she first issues a segment with user data. If delivery 
confirmation is still missing, then the segment with 
steganogram is sent. The situation continues until the sender 
receives the correct ACK (Fig. 3). 
 
 
Figure 3 RTO-based RSTEG segment recovery 
example 
 
For example, consider the scenario in which we invoke 
0.5% intentional retransmissions. If 5% is lost, it means that 
the above-described mechanism will take place only for 
0.025% of steganogram segments, and thus it will be used 
rarely. 
III. RSTEG IMPLEMENTATION 
Experimental RSTEG implementation has been done on 
Linux 2.6.27.7-9 kernel. It allows to measure steganographic 
bandwidth, retransmission difference and other values 
presented in Section V. Some important modifications to the 
TCP/IP stack are described below. 
A. Sending procedure modifications 
Sending phase was modified to queue steganograms 
delivered by application layer and wait for cover data (which 
also come from the application). When cover data comes to 
Linux kernel, IS (Identifying Sequence) is inserted to mark 
segment for retransmission. In this experimental version 
predefined data is used as IS to recognize it easily in network 
traffic dumps.  
The Linux TCP/IP stack has some data transfer and 
kernel operations’ optimizations e.g. data collation, putting 
data in many blocks in memory [7]. These optimizations 
cannot be used with RSTEG. The first one could cause 
joining segments containing secret and cover data.  Joining 
only cover or secret data in one segment does not affect 
steganographic transmission, but in this experiment we 
turned off this mechanism to simplify procedure. The second 
optimization mechanism is used with network cards that 
support scatter-gather operations, in other cases all user data 
is linearized by kernel. Changing data, which is split in many 
memory blocks, require complex operations, so we decided 
to always linearize user data. 
B. Receiving procedure modifications 
Receiver’s task is to recognize segments containing IS. 
The sequence is computed for each incoming segment and 
compared with extracted one. If segment is recognized as 
RSTEG retransmission request, then no ACK is sent, 
otherwise data is acknowledged and delivered to an 
application.  
If steganogram arrives and receiver detects lack of 
retransmission request for this segment then no ACK is sent 
and recovery procedure is applied (see Section II). 
Among all kernel optimization mechanisms only adjacent 
segment collapsing is unable to work with RSTEG. Adjacent 
segment collapsing joins data from many segments into one 
block before delivering to application.  RSTEG requires 
delivering segments separately because steganograms are 
recognized also in application layer. 
C. Retransmission procedure modifications 
Retransmission procedure is the most important phase of 
steganographic communication. For each segment marked 
for retransmission by RSTEG, retransmission counter is 
created. If retransmission is triggered and counter is zero or 
even then the payload is replaced by steganogram, otherwise 
segment is retransmitted without change (recovery 
procedure). 
After data replacement it is necessary to update also the 
checksum unless network card supports TCP Checksum 
Offload, which processes checksum calculation on the 
network card. 
IV. EXPERIMENT METHODOLOGY 
 
The network topology (Fig. 4) was designed to fit 
Internet traffic retransmission statistics (see Section II). The 
SRC node transmits TCP traffic and UDP background traffic 
to DEST node through 1 Mb/s bottleneck, which causes 
natural retransmissions. 
 Traffic parameters which are presented in table below 
were matched to achieve ~3-4% of natural retransmissions 
with zero size buffers on routers R1 and R2. 
    
  
 
Figure 4. Experimental network topology 
 
TABLE I. EXPERIMENTAL TRAFFIC PARAMETERS 
Parameter name Value 
TCP throughput 125 kb/s 
UDP throughput 1 160 kb/s 
Transmission time 600 s 
Measured time 540 s 
Measure start delay 60 s 
Payload size 1200 B 
 
Network traffic was measured for 9 minutes, starting 
after 1 minute from the beginning of transmission. The 
RSTEG intentional retransmission probability (IRP) was 
changed from 0 to 5% with intermediary steps at 0%, 1%, 
2%, 3%, 4% and 5%.  
In the above simulation scenario, five parameters were 
measured: 
• Steganographic Bandwidth (SB) - the amount of the 
steganogram transmitted using RSTEG during one 
second [B/s]. Parameter may be expressed as 
 
][Bps
T
SNS SSB
⋅
=  
where: 
NS – the number of segments used for hidden 
 communication 
 SS – the size of segment payload 
 T – the duration of the connection 
  
SB was measured by receiver`s application, which 
counted number of the steganograms and their size. 
 
• Retransmissions Difference (RD) - the difference 
between retransmissions in a network after applying 
RSTEG and in a network before applying RSTEG. 
This parameter can be used to estimate the influence 
that RSTEG has on the TCP retransmissions rate. 
Thus, it can illustrate how to choose the correct 
intentional retransmission probability to limit the risk 
of detection.  
 
RD was measured with Wireshark sniffer 
(www.wireshark.org) in pcap traffic dumps by 
counting segments suspected to be retransmitted. 
 
• Steganographic Retransmissions Ratio (SR) - the 
amount of steganographic retransmissions in all 
retransmissions. 
 
• TCP Throughput (TT) - the effective TCP 
throughput, measured on the DEST node. 
 
• Effective IRP - IRP measured on the DEST node. 
 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
The results achieved in the experiment are presented in 
Fig. 5 and 6.  
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Figure 5. Steganographic Bandwidth (SB) and TCP 
Throughput (TT) 
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Figure 6. Steganographic Retransmissions Ratio (SR) 
Retransmissions Difference (RD) 
 
 
Table 2 summarizes achieved experimental results. 
 
  
TABLE II. SUMMARIZED EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
The results show that bandwidth of the steganographic 
channel is increasing together with intentional 
retransmissions, however increase of RD is slower (Fig. 5). In 
real world TCP/IP stack implementation the congestion 
avoidance algorithms ([7], [8]) are reducing congestion 
window, which is natural response to retransmissions. That 
effect causes throughput reduction and smaller 
retransmissions difference than was intentionally triggered in 
[1%; 2%] IRP range. When IRP reaches 3% its value is 
around number of retransmissions for normal network 
conditions (RSTEG-free) and RD is non-zero because of 
random choice of segments marked for retransmission. Next, 
the IRP reaches up to 5%, which causes more retransmissions 
in the network again, but still fewer than number of the 
intentional retransmissions because of congestion avoidance 
algorithms. 
Fig. 6 shows that in network congestion state intentional 
retransmissions are reducing the number of natural ones (but 
of course total number of retransmissions is still higher). The 
optimal intentional retransmissions level is 5% when almost 
all retransmitted segments are used for steganographic 
communication.  
Keeping total retransmissions number on reasonable 
level is necessary to avoid detection.  The experimental 
results show that we can achieve decent steganographic 
bandwidth while maintaining non-suspicious level of 
retransmissions. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
RSTEG is a hybrid network steganography method which 
to transmit steganograms utilizes intentionally invoked 
retransmission.  
In this paper we presented how RSTEG can be integrated 
into Linux kernel and we showed the first experimental 
results made on real TCP/IP stack. 
The results proved that RSTEG is an effective 
steganographic method which offers relatively high 
steganographic bandwidth when compared with other 
network steganography methods [4]. The steganographic 
bandwidth depends on RSTEG intentional retransmissions 
level. 
The results have shown that RSTEG intentional 
retransmissions level affects number of usually 
retransmitted segments during connection. Keeping 
reasonable total retransmissions level is very important 
because of RSTEG detection potential methods. RSTEG 
steganalysis method may be implemented with a passive 
warden [2] (or some other network node responsible for 
steganography usage detection). Passive warden must be 
able to monitor all the TCP traffic and for each TCP 
connection it must store sent segments for the given period 
of time, which depends on the retransmission timer i.e. 
passive warden must store the segment until it is 
acknowledged by the receiver so the retransmission is not 
possible any more. When there is a retransmission issued, 
passive warden compares originally sent segment with 
retransmitted one and if the payload differs RSTEG is 
detected and the segment is dropped. However, it should be 
noted that there may be serious performance issues involved 
if passive warden monitors all the TCP connections and 
must store a large number of the segments. [4]. Moreover 
the RSTEG causes less increase of total retransmissions 
level than IRP level which makes it harder to detect. Of 
course it is still needed to keep intentional retransmissions 
level on reasonable level. 
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IRP SB RD SR TCP throughput Effective IRP 
 [B/s] σ [%] σ [%] σ [kB/s] σ [%] σ 
0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 25.6 0.2 0 0 
1% 252 18 0.46 0.23 24 2.9 25.1 0.2 1.01 0.08 
2% 461 37 0.48 0.23 45 4.3 24.6 0.1 1.87 0.15 
3% 665 37 0.22 0.18 69 3.4 24.2 0.2 2.74 0.16 
4% 867 36 0.48 0.16 85 5.1 24.2 0.1 3.58 0.15 
5% 1056 58 0.83 0.2 96 2.3 24.1 0.1 4.39 0.24 
